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Abstract
This study analyzes gender diﬀ  erences in the intergenerational earnings mobility of 
second-generation migrants in Germany. The analysis takes into account potential 
inﬂ  uences like assortative mating in the form of ethnic marriages and the parental 
integration measured by parents’ years since migration. First, intergenerational 
earnings elasticities are estimated at the mean and along the earnings distribution. 
The results do not reveal large diﬀ  erences in the intergenerational mobility – neither 
between natives and migrants nor between men and women. Second, intergenerational 
changes in the relative earnings position are analyzed. The results show that migrants 
are less likely than natives to worsen their relative earnings position while they have the 
same probability as natives to improve their earnings position. In summary, migrants 
are mostly as (im)mobile as the native population.
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The intergenerational transmission of economic status has been in the focus of re-
search for a long time. Economic mobility or persistence provides important insights
into the equality of opportunities within a society. In particular, the discussion about
the rising income inequality in many countries fuels the discussion about in how far
the current income distribution is fostered by inheritance of the social status from
parents to children.
In Germany, second-generation migrants, i.e. the children of migrants who are
born and raised in Germany, make up a large and growing share of the population.
In 2009, 19.6% (16 million) of the German population had a migration background
of which almost one third was German-born (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010). But
while traditional immigration countries like the US, Canada or Australia register
a successful integration of second-generation migrants, they lack behind in terms
of education and labor market outcomes in Germany (Fertig and Schmidt, 2002;
Riphahn, 2003; Algan et al., 2010). The analysis of the degree of intergenerational
earnings mobility can provide important insights into whether second-generation
migrants are able to overcome the disadvantages faced by ﬁrst-generation migrants or
whether a high degree of persistence is one reason for the divergence in the economic
outcomes of the oﬀspring of natives and migrants.
The factors which may lead to diﬀerences in intergenerational earnings trans-
mission between natives and migrants within a country are manifold and imply
accordingly diﬀerent policy implications. Parents diﬀer in observed and unobserved
characteristics and a priori it is unclear whether migrants are more or less mobile
than natives. On the one hand, ﬁrst-generation migrants may put a larger emphasis
on their children’s education than natives as the migration decision may have already
been driven by expectations and hopes about their children’s future possibilities in
the host country. In this case, migrants are likely to be more mobile than natives.
On the other hand, a lack of familiarity of migrants with the educational system
and/or a lack of connections and access to important networks may reduce migrants’
4earnings mobility if compared to natives. Furthermore, the inﬂuence of the family
might be stronger among migrants than among natives as natives have more access
to and therefore are more inﬂuenced by the society outside the family (Hammarstedt
and Palme, 2006).
When analyzing the intergenerational earnings mobility of second-generation mi-
grant men and women jointly, it has to be taken into account that transmission
mechanisms do not only diﬀer between natives and migrants but as well between
men and women. Reasons for such diﬀerences lie for example in assortative mating
and subsequent labor supply decisions of women (Raaum et al., 2007, p.12).
Finally, there is evidence that the gender gap in intergenerational mobility itself
diﬀers between natives and migrants (Chen et al., 2007). The cultural background
can inﬂuence family formation behavior, child care arrangements and labor market
participation. This may be reﬂected among other aspects in diﬀerent shares of en-
dogamous marriages of second-generation migrant men and women, i.e. marriages
to persons with the same ethnic background. Furthermore, diﬀerences in the gender
gap could be due to diﬀerent degrees of aversion to earnings inequality of native
and migrant parents, which inﬂuence the initial investment in education (Bauer and
Gang, 2001).
The aim of this study is to analyze the intergenerational earnings mobility of
second-generation migrant men and women in Germany and compare their degree of
mobility to the native population. For this purpose, two approaches are used. First,
intergenerational earnings elasticities are estimated. This is done at the mean as well
as along the earnings distribution by using OLS and quantile regression methods.
Second, the relative earnings mobility is analyzed. Thereby, mobility is measured as
intergenerational changes in the relative earnings positions.
2 Literature
There are diﬀerent mechanisms which relate parents’ and the children’s earnings.
Intergenerational earnings persistence can be explained by the so called mechanical
5transmission, i.e. the transmission of genetics, behavior, cultural traits, and environ-
mental factors like e.g. family reputation or connections. A large literature focuses
on the inﬂuence of the parents’ investment in human capital on the earnings mobility
(Becker and Tomes, 1979; Chadwick and Solon, 2002). Parents with higher earnings
are better able to ﬁnance and support their children’s education. As a consequence
of these two mechanisms, higher earning parents are more likely to have children
with higher earnings themselves as a certain “endowment”, which contributed to
high earnings of parents in the ﬁrst place, is transferred to the children.
In addition, intergenerational earnings transmission may be aﬀected by assorta-
tive mating, i.e., the tendency of two people with similar characteristics like educa-
tion, health or occupation to marry. In terms of family earnings, a strong degree of
assortative mating can foster a society’s earnings distribution and lower mobility.1
An additional factor which may increase the inﬂuence of assortative mating among
migrants is the ethnic background. Besides searching for similarities in socioeconomic
factors, migrants may prefer a partner with the same ethnic background. This can
have a signiﬁcant impact on the economic integration of migrants. Meng (2005), for
example, shows that intermarried migrants earn higher incomes than their endog-
amously married counterparts. Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2010) ﬁnd evidence
that in particular better educated migrants are more likely to intermarry.
However, there is mixed evidence about whether endogamous marriages are more
present and important among male or female migrants. In the U.S., Chiswick and
Houseworth (2008) ﬁnd female migrants to be less likely to marry a native partner
than their male counterparts. This could be explained by cultural norms which tie
daughters relatively more to their family home. Parents may impose stricter dating
rules on daughters or the migrant women themselves might have a preference for
endogamy in the child raising process. In contrast, Chen et al. (2007) ﬁnd women
in general to be more mobile in terms of marriage and earnings than men and this
gender gap is even more pronounced for migrants.
For a long time the research on intergenerational earnings mobility has focused
1As educational institutions are important meeting places for potential spouses, the early track-
ing in the German educational system is likely to support this process.
6on the relationship between fathers and their sons. The growing literature on the
intergenerational transmission of the income status for daughters predominantly ﬁnds
weaker intergenerational relations between daughters and their parents than between
sons and their parents. But while the intergenerational elasticities of individual labor
earnings are still found to be substantial in US, no signiﬁcant correlation between
parents’ and daughters’ earnings is found for Germany (Couch and Dunn, 1997;
Chadwick and Solon, 2002).
Making a cross-country comparison, Raaum et al. (2007) reveal a higher degree
of mobility of women in Denmark, Finland and Norway than in the UK and the
US. Furthermore, the authors ﬁnd lower earnings persistence at the bottom of the
parental earnings distribution in the Nordic countries which increases sharply to-
wards the top of the income distribution. Ermisch et al. (2006) provide evidence for
the strong relationship between assortative mating and the intergenerational trans-
mission of earnings in Germany. The authors ﬁnd that 40-50% of the covariance
between parents’ and children’s family income can be attributed to the spouse.
Aydemir et al. (2009) compare the intergenerational earnings elasticities of na-
tives and migrants in Canada. The authors ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
intergenerational income elasticities among migrants and the Canadian population.
Furthermore, they do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between fathers’ and daugh-
ters’ earnings, neither. Other studies for Germany and Sweden ﬁnd that immi-
grants are less mobile than their native counterparts (Yuksel, 2009; Hammarstedt
and Palme, 2006).
The study at hand takes up two current developments in the literate – expanding
the analysis of intergenerational earnings mobility to women and migrants at the
same time – and analyzes one potential source of the relatively poor labor market
outcomes of second-generation migrants in Germany.
73 Empirical Strategy
The key issue in the analysis of intergenerational earnings mobility is to ﬁnd an
appropriate earnings measure. The most desirable measure are lifetime earnings of
parents and their children. However, as lifetime earnings are rarely observable - in
particular lifetime earnings of parents and children at the same time - they are often
proxied by annual earnings.
While in the textbook error-in-variables framework errors in the measurement
of the dependent variable (children’s earnings) lead simply to more noise, errors in
the right-hand-side variable (parents’ earnings) lead to an attenuation bias in OLS
estimates. Therefore, many empirical studies use averages of parents’ earnings to
reduce the attenuation bias (Zimmermann, 1992; Black and Devereux, 2010).
However, if the relation between current income and lifetime income varies sys-
tematically over the life cycle, the assumptions of the textbook errors-in-variables
model do no longer hold (Haider and Solon, 2006; Böhlmark and Lindquist, 2006;
Brenner, 2010). In this case, measurement errors in the independent as well as in
the dependent variable can lead to inconsistency of the estimates. Furthermore, it
is no longer clear whether measurement errors induce an ampliﬁcation or an atten-
uation bias. For this reason, some studies advice likewise against taking single year
observations of children’s earnings like it has been done in most previous research
(Yuksel, 2009; Nybohm and Stuhler, 2011).
Due to life cycle variations in income, the age at which earnings of children and
parents are observed is an important factor in estimating intergenerational earnings
mobility. Earnings at some ages are better suitable as proxies for lifetime earnings
than earnings at other ages. Persons with high lifetime earnings tend to enter the
labor market later but exhibit faster earnings growth. Thus, considering earnings
at an early stage of the career may lead to an underestimation of lifetime earnings
whereas taking earnings at a very late stage may overestimate lifetime earnings.
Furthermore, Brenner (2010) shows that lifetime earnings proﬁles diﬀer between
natives and migrants. One explanation for this heterogeneity in earnings growth
8rates is that migrants undergo an assimilation process during which they acquire
country speciﬁc human capital and which leads to higher earnings growth rates if
compared to natives. Brenner shows that the attenuation bias over the life cycle
is signiﬁcantly larger among migrants than among natives. This could lead to the
spurious conclusion that mobility is relatively larger among migrants. Even though
Brenner conﬁrms that taking averages of earnings contributes to reducing the atten-
uation bias, he warns that point estimates still need to be interpreted cautiously.
To reduce a potential bias in the estimation of the intergenerational earnings
mobility, some adjustments are made. First, the sample of children is restricted
to 25- to 45-year-olds. In this age, most persons – independent of their educational
level – have entered the labor market. The parents’ age is restricted to 30 to 65 years.
Second, the analysis is based on averages of earnings only. The earnings information
of the children is based on the years 1990 to 2009, whereas earnings information
for the fathers is based on all currently available years from 1984 to 2009. The
reason for the time restriction is that second-generation migrants are on average
very young and therefore the number of earnings observations of second-generation
migrants before 1990 is very low.2 Finally, it has to be taken into account that the
individual averages of earnings are based on annual information from diﬀerent years.
Thus, even though earnings are inﬂation-adjusted, this does not control for changes
of the overall earnings levels over the years.3 Therefore, annual earnings are weighted
before taking averages. The average earnings 𝑦 of person 𝑖 are calculated according






















𝑖𝑡 are the earnings of person 𝑖 in generation 𝑔 (children,parents) in year 𝑡,
2This is due to the migration history of Germany. As peaks of migration were during the phase
of recruitment of so-called “guest workers” in the 1950s to 1970s followed by waves of migration due
to family reuniﬁcation, the children of ﬁrst-generation migrants are still relatively young (Bauer et
al., 2005).
3All earnings measures are inﬂation-adjusted by multiplying with the consumer price index by
federal state (RWI, 2009).
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𝑔
𝑡 are the average earnings of all persons in generation 𝑔 in year 𝑡, 𝑑𝑖𝑡 a dummy
variable indicating whether the earnings of person 𝑖 are observed in the respective
year and 𝑡𝑔 equals the year 1990 for children and 1984 for parents. To further reduce
a potential bias, the sample is restricted to persons for whose fathers there are at
least ﬁve earnings observations (
∑2009
𝑡=1984 (𝑑𝑖𝑡) ≥ 5).
In the ﬁrst part of this study, the intergenerational earnings elasticities are esti-
mated. The elasticities describe in how far the earnings of the children are determined
by the earnings of the parents. Therefore, high elasticities imply a low degree of in-
tergenerational mobility. Age is included in the model to control for potential life
cycle variations in earnings of the four population groups (native men, native women,
migrant men and migrant women). The age is the average age of children and par-
ents when the earnings are observed. As in most families in the parental generation
the father is the main earner, the average age of the father is taken representatively
for the parental age.
To ﬁnd out whether the intergenerational earnings elasticities are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent between the population groups, a fully interacted model is estimated.
The baseline model is
ln𝑦𝑖ℎ = 𝗽0 + 𝗽1 ln𝑦
𝑝







+𝗽6𝐷𝑓 + 𝗽7𝐷𝑓 ∗ ln𝑦
𝑝
𝑖ℎ + 𝗽8𝐷𝑓 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝗽9𝐷𝑓 ∗ (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖)
2
+𝗽10𝐷𝑚 + 𝗽11𝐷𝑚 ∗ ln𝑦
𝑝








+𝗽16𝐷𝑓𝐷𝑚 + 𝗽17𝐷𝑓𝐷𝑚 ∗ ln𝑦
𝑝
𝑖ℎ ++ 𝗽18𝐷𝑓𝐷𝑚 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝗽19𝐷𝑓𝐷𝑚 ∗ (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖)
2
+𝑒𝑖ℎ,
where 𝑦𝑖ℎ are the average weighted earnings of individual 𝑖 in family ℎ, 𝑦
𝑝
𝑖ℎ are the
average earnings of the parents 𝑝 of person 𝑖, 𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑝
𝑖ℎ is the average age of the father,
𝐷𝑓 is a female dummy and 𝐷𝑚 a migrant dummy. The standard errors are clustered
on the family level because the sample includes families with more than one child
and it is not likely that the residuals are independent across siblings.
10As the degree of integration of the migrant population may inﬂuence the earnings
mobility, the analysis is expanded by including diﬀerent indicators of integration like
endogamous marriages and the parents’ years since migration.
The intergenerational earnings elasticities are estimated by OLS and by quantile
regression estimation methods. The latter provides insights into variations of the
degree of mobility along the earnings distribution of the children. As the German
migration history is largely determined by the recruitment of low-skilled workers, a
large share of ﬁrst-generation migrants can be found at the lower end of the earnings
distribution. Therefore, it is of particular interest whether the oﬀspring of this
important group of migrants is able to overcome their initial disadvantage.
However, as quantile regression results only provide information about changes at
the earnings quantiles but not about changes within the quantiles, the second part
of this study is concerned with intergenerational changes of the relative earnings
positions. For this purpose, earnings quantiles are determined separately for parents
and children as well as for sons and daughters. Furthermore, the children are grouped
into 25- to 30-year-olds, 30- to 40-year-olds and 40- to 45-year-olds and the parents
into 30- to 40-year-olds, 40- to 50-year-olds and 50- to 65-year-olds. Then the relative
earnings positions within the earnings quantiles are compared between parents and
children.
4D a t a
The analysis is based on individual-level data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP).4 The SOEP is a longitudinal study of private households which
started in 1984 and which samples more than 20,000 persons each year, includ-
ing Germans, foreigners and recent immigrants. The data structure allows a direct
linkage between children and their parents.
4The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v3.0 (Nov
2010) for Stata. PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu). The
PanelWhiz generated DO ﬁle to retrieve the SOEP data used here and any Panelwhiz Plugins are
available upon request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are my own. Haisken-DeNew
and Hahn (2006) describe PanelWhiz in detail.
11The sample includes German natives, ﬁrst- and second-generation migrants. A
second-generation migrant is deﬁned either as a person who is born in Germany
but who does not hold German citizenship or as a migrant who arrived before the
age of 6.5 In addition, this group comprises persons who are born in Germany,
hold German citizenship and whose parents are both immigrants. The sample is
restricted to persons living in West Germany and Berlin as very few migrants live in
East Germany.
The earnings measure used in the analysis is the annual household labor income.6
To obtain the equivalent household labor income, the overall household labor income
is divided by modiﬁed OECD equivalence weights.7 Children who live in the same
household as their parents and therefore report the same household labor income are
excluded.
The household labor income has several advantages as earnings measure for the
analysis. First, persons with zero individual labor income can be included in the
analysis. Furthermore, unlike most other studies, the analysis is not exclusively
focused on the relationship between children’s and their fathers’ earnings as the par-
ents’ household income comprises as well mothers’ earnings. The main disadvantage
of this measure is that it cannot be diﬀerentiated in how far the intergenerational
mobility is inﬂuenced by direct earnings transmission from parents to children and
in how far it is inﬂuenced by the choice of the partner and/or the household compo-
sition.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics separately for native sons and daughters
and migrant sons and daughters. The full sample comprises 1,829 persons. The
children are on average 29 to 30 years old and the fathers 51 to 53. The share of
married persons is higher among the migrants. While 40% (32%) of native women
5This is a common proceeding as young immigrants have the same educational background than
their native counterparts.
6Even though individual earnings like the hourly wages would be desirable, this measure is not
applicable in the present context. As wages are only observable for employed persons, this would
lead to a reduction of the sample to 82 (36) observations for (married) second-generation migrant
women.
7The OECD equivalence weight assigns a value of 1 to the household head, a values of 0.5 to
each additional adult member and 0.3 to each child (OECD, 2005).
12(men) are married, the respective share of migrants is 59% (47%). Within the group
of married migrants, the share of second-generation migrants who are married to a
partner with the same ethnic background is comparable between sons and daughters
(34% and 36%). The average equivalent household labor income varies between
19,313e for migrant women and 25,170e for native men. There are three striking
features with respect to the income. First, men report higher incomes than women.8
Second, natives have in general higher incomes than migrants. And third, while all
four population groups report higher incomes than their parents, this gap is more
pronounced among migrants. Finally, the table reveals that the children’s average
incomes are on average based on 6 to 8 income observations. The respective numbers
for parents are 12 to 13.
Table 2 presents the shares of persons in diﬀerent conditional income quantiles.
It is noticeable that migrants – children as well as parents – are more present in the
lower earnings deciles than natives. Above the median, the share of migrants never
equals or exceeds the share of natives.
5R e s u l t s
5.1 Intergenerational Earnings Elasticities
Table 3 presents the results for the estimated intergenerational income elasticities.
The estimated coeﬃcient of the parents’ income accounts for 0.133. This is the
intergenerational income elasticity of native men. While both the coeﬃcients of
the interaction of a female dummy with the parental income (0.145) as well as the
interaction of a migrant dummy with the parental income (0.218) are positive, the
coeﬃcient of the triple interaction between a female dummy, a migrant dummy
and the parental income is negative (-0.637). However, apart from the coeﬃcient
of the triple interaction, none of the coeﬃcients is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Thus, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the earnings mobility of native men and
8Looking at married persons, men and women should report the same household incomes on
average. Studies however found a gender bias in the way household income is reported (Chen et
al., 2007).
13women and migrant men. Migrant women have a signiﬁcantly lower intergenerational
earnings elasticity and are therefore the most mobile group.9
The magnitude and the relation of the coeﬃcients are comparable to previous
ﬁndings in the literature. One of the few studies analyzing intergenerational earnings
mobility as well in terms of family income instead of individual income is the study
by Ermisch et al. (2006). The authors ﬁnd intergenerational earnings elasticities of
0.178 for men and of 0.209 for women. In a comparison of natives and migrants,
Yuksel (2009) ﬁnds intergenerational earnings elasticities between 0.19 and 0.26 for
native men and between 0.37 and 0.40 for migrant men. Also the negative coeﬃcient
for second-generation migrant women is in line with previous studies which have
found negative earnings elasticities for daughters (Couch and Dunn, 1997; Yuksel,
2009).
The second column in Table 3 presents the results including a marriage dummy.
While marriage has no signiﬁcant impact on the earnings mobility of natives and
second-generation migrant men, marriage decreases the earnings mobility of second-
generation migrant women. This indicates that the high degree of mobility among
migrant women is driven by single migrant women.
To test the initial assumption that in particular ethnic marriages may inﬂuence
the earnings mobility, the model speciﬁcation in the third column focuses on married
persons only and includes a control variable for ethnic marriages. The coeﬃcient of
the parental income is positive and has turned signiﬁcant at the 5%-level (0.190). On
average, the earnings elasticities do not diﬀer between the four population groups.
Second-generation migrant men who are endogamously married have, however, a
signiﬁcantly higher earnings elasticity than natives and than migrant men who are
in mixed marriages. The ethnic background of the spouse has no inﬂuence the
earnings mobility of second-generation migrant women. Thus, against the initial
assumption that migrant women might be more tied to their family (earnings) by
ethnic marriages than migrant men, the contrary seems to be true.
Finally, the inﬂuence of the parental integration on the earnings mobility is an-
9This result is conﬁrmed by pairwise comparison of the intergenerational earnings elasticities
between the four groups.
14alyzed. Therefore, the fathers’ years since migration before birth of the child are
taken as a proxy for the integration and are interacted with the parental income.
This shall capture the eﬀect that migrant parents’ preferences and attitudes may
change over time. If for example the degree of aversion against earnings inequality
between sons and daughters changes, this can have a signiﬁcant impact on the in-
tergenerational earnings mobility. The results in column 4 reveal, however, that the
intergenerational earnings elasticities do not change with the parents’ duration of
stay in Germany.
As it is of particular interest whether low-earnings migrants are able to overcome
their initial disadvantage, the baseline model is reestimated using quantile regression
methods. This is done for the full sample and separately for married persons only.
Figure 1 displays the estimated intergenerational earnings elasticities for the four
population groups along the earnings distribution of the children and Table 4 shows
the respective estimated coeﬃcients of an interacted model at the 10th, 50th and
90th quantile.
While there is an increasing trend in the intergenerational earnings elasticity
among migrants in the overall sample, the reverse is true for the subsample of married
persons. The latter is alarming as it signiﬁes that migrants with relatively low
earnings are less mobile than migrants with higher earnings. In particular for this
group of migrants a certain degree of mobility is necessary to improve the own
earnings situation. However, two things have to be taken into account. First, the
sample size of married migrants is relatively small. Second, Table 4 shows that at the
lowest 10th quantile of the earnings distribution the estimated earnings elasticities
do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer between migrants and natives. Only at the median, second-
generation migrant men have a signiﬁcantly higher earnings elasticity than natives
and migrant women. Thus, these results weaken concerns about a low degree of
mobility at the lower end of the earnings distribution. In contrast, in particular
second-generation migrant women reveal a relatively large degree of mobility.
But even though quantile regressions provide additional insights into the inter-
generational earnings mobility, the inference about changes within the earnings dis-
15tribution is still limited. A low degree of mobility is less reason for concern, if there
is suﬃcient change within the earnings distribution, i.e. if migrants can improve
the relative earnings position from one generation to the next. For this reason, the
next section presents an analysis of intergenerational changes in the relative earnings
positions.
5.2 Relative Earnings Mobility
Table 5 presents the share of persons who have improved their relative earnings
position compared to their parents (“Upward Mobility”) and the share of persons
who have worsened their relative earnings position (“Downward Mobility”).
Women exhibit a larger degree of upward mobility than men whereas the diﬀer-
ence is larger among migrants than among natives. While second-generation migrant
women show a lower degree of downward mobility than migrant men, the degree of
downward mobility is comparable between native men and women. These patterns
are even more pronounced among married persons.
To analyze whether the diﬀerences in mobility between the population groups are
signiﬁcant, a linear probability model of the probability of having a higher (lower)
earnings position compared to the parents is estimated.10 Again, the particular
inﬂuence of ethnic marriages on the earnings mobility is taken into account.
Table 6 and 7 present the respective results for upward and downward mobility.
Looking at upward mobility ﬁrst, there are no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the four population groups in the full sample. The results in column 2 show
furthermore that marriage has no signiﬁcant impact on the upward mobility of men
while married women have a signiﬁcantly higher probability to improve their relative
earnings position than men and single women.
It is tested whether the type of marriage has an impact on the relative mobility
of married migrants (column 4). However, neither the upward mobility of migrant
men nor the upward mobility of migrant women is inﬂuenced by ethnic marriages.
Turning to the probability of downward mobility (Table 7), it is found that mi-
10Using a probit estimation does not alter the results.
16grants have on average a signiﬁcantly lower probability to worsen their relative earn-
ings position from one generation to the next than natives. After controlling for mar-
riage, the diﬀerences between natives and migrants disappear. Furthermore, while
single women have a higher probability of downward mobility than men, the reverse
is true for married women. As in the case of upward mobility, ethnic marriages do
not have a signiﬁcant impact on the probability of downward mobility.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The objective of this study is to analyze gender diﬀerences in the intergenerational
earnings mobility of second-generation migrants in Germany and compare these to
German natives.
We do not ﬁnd evidence for large diﬀerences in the intergenerational earnings
elasticities – neither between men and women nor between natives and migrants.
Gender diﬀerences are more pronounced among the migrant population with migrant
women being on average more mobile than migrant men. While ethnic marriages
inﬂuence the intergenerational earnings elasticities of migrant men, the parents’ years
since migration do not have a signiﬁcant impact on the children’s earnings. Quantile
regression results mainly conﬁrm these results.
In terms of relative upward mobility, there are again few diﬀerences between the
population groups. Married women stand out with being on average more likely
than men to improve their relative earnings position. Furthermore, migrants are
less likely than natives to worsen their relative earnings position. Against the initial
assumption, there is no evidence that ethnic marriages tie in particular second-
generation migrant women more to their parents.
Our results indicate that second-generation migrants are on average as mobile or
immobile as the native population. While they are less likely to worsen their economic
position, they are not more likely than natives to improve their relative earnings posi-
tion. However, given the worse economic background of second-generation migrants,
this indicates that second-generation migrants are still not able fully overcome their
17initial disadvantage and improve their relative earnings position.
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21Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Second
Natives Generation
Mean SD Mean SD
Daughters
A g e 2 9 . 23 . 6 2 8 . 73 . 2
Married 0.400 0.490 0.586 0.494
Endogamously married - - 0.357 0.481
Household labor income 22,456 12,667 19,313 11,569
No. of earnings obs. 7.1 5.5 6.3 5.0
Household labor income of parents 21,173 8,695 14,040 7,969
Age of father 51.1 6.7 51.6 6.7
No. of earnings obs. of parents 12.3 5.0 12.4 5.2
Number of observations 772 155
Sons
A g e 3 0 . 44 . 0 2 9 . 73 . 3
Married 0.317 0.466 0.470 0.501
Endogamously married - - 0.344 0.477
Household labor income 25,170 13,219 20,657 12,568
No. of earnings obs. 7.6 5.5 6.6 4.5
Household labor income of parents 21,780 9,282 15,539 7,614
Age of father 52.6 6.6 51.4 6.6
No. of earnings obs. of parents 11.7 4.6 13.4 4.7
Number of observations 738 164
NOTE.–Weighted numbers.
22Table 2: Income Quantiles
Daughters Sons
Second Second
Natives Generation Natives Generation
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Lowest 10th 10.6 30.8 10.5 30.8 9.8 29.7 16.3 37.1
10th to 20th 8.9 28.4 13.9 34.7 9.1 28.8 18.0 38.5
20th to 30th 7.6 26.5 16.8 37.5 8.9 28.6 7.2 26.0
30th to 40th 8.3 27.6 17.5 38.1 9.9 29.9 12.0 32.6
40th to 50th 9.2 28.9 7.9 27.1 8.7 28.1 16.9 37.5
50th to 60th 10.5 30.7 6.2 24.2 10.8 31.1 6.7 25.2
60th to 70th 11.5 31.9 6.2 24.1 11.0 31.4 3.5 18.5
70th to 80th 11.7 32.1 5.8 23.5 10.7 30.9 6.5 24.8
80th to 90th 10.9 31.2 7.1 25.8 10.6 30.9 4.6 21.0
Highest 10th 10.8 31.1 8.1 27.3 10.4 30.6 8.2 27.6
Parents
Lowest 10th 8.0 27.2 32.4 47.0 7.1 25.7 22.4 41.8
10th to 20th 8.6 28.1 15.8 36.6 9.6 29.5 22.5 41.9
20th to 30th 8.0 27.2 21.1 40.9 9.4 29.2 11.1 31.5
30th to 40th 12.3 32.9 8.0 27.2 9.5 29.3 8.0 27.2
40th to 50th 10.0 30.0 7.7 26.7 8.9 28.6 10.2 30.3
50th to 60th 8.4 27.8 4.1 19.9 12.7 33.3 9.4 29.3
60th to 70th 14.1 34.8 1.3 11.5 8.8 28.4 2.9 16.8
70th to 80th 9.6 29.5 2.5 15.6 11.7 32.1 3.9 19.5
80th to 90th 10.8 31.0 2.3 15.1 11.0 31.3 6.9 25.4
Highest 10th 10.1 30.2 4.8 21.5 11.3 31.7 2.7 16.2
N 756 153 723 162
NOTE.–See notes Table 2. All values in %.
23Table 3: Intergenerational Income Elasticities (OLS)
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
ln𝑦
𝑓
𝑖 0.133 0.109 0.190** 0.133
(0.083) (0.109) (0.082) (0.083)
ln𝑦
𝑓
𝑖 × female 0.145 0.253 0.044 0.145
(0.143) (0.197) (0.133) (0.143)
ln𝑦
𝑓









𝑖 0.218 0.164 -0.034 0.220
(0.180) (0.313) (0.135) (0.187)
ln𝑦
𝑓
𝑖 × female -0.637** -1.161** 0.009 -0.560
(0.263) (0.499) (0.188) (0.401)
ln𝑦
𝑓




























𝑖 × female × ysm2 1.008
(0.870)
R2 0.132 0.161 0.150 0.135
F 7.938 7.498 4.799 6.362
N 1,808 1,808 775 1,808
NOTE.– Weights are used. Standard errors are adjusted for repeated observations on
family level. Further control variables are age, age square as well as the age of the father
and its square.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
24Table 4: Intergenerational Income Elasticities (Quantile Regression)
Quantiles
OLS 10th 50th 90th
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.




𝑖 0.133 0.305* 0.097*** 0.179**
(0.083) (0.166) (0.027) (0.072)
ln𝑦
𝑓
𝑖 × female 0.145 0.186 0.105*** 0.031




𝑖 0.218 -0.210 0.250*** 0.180
(0.180) (0.243) (0.066) (0.155)
ln𝑦
𝑓
𝑖 × female -0.637** -0.732* -0.339*** -0.085
(0.263) (0.377) (0.094) (0.188)
R2 0.132
F 7.938





𝑖 0.190** 0.302 0.171*** 0.292***
(0.082) (0.273) (0.058) (0.098)
ln𝑦
𝑓
𝑖 × female 0.044 0.319 0.044 -0.119




𝑖 0.261* 0.424 0.266** 0.040
(0.142) (0.393) (0.115) (0.206)
ln𝑦
𝑓
𝑖 × female -0.294 -0.728 -0.326** 0.237
(0.192) (0.528) (0.148) (0.236)
R2 0.141
F 4.625
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.115 0.098
N 775 775
NOTE.– See notes Table 3
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
25Table 5: Relative Mobility
Native Second-Gen. Native Second-Gen.
Women Women Men Men
Full Sample
Upward Mobility 46.9 62.8 43.6 50.1
Downward Mobility 42.9 27.1 42.7 31.7
Number of observations 756 153 723 162
Married Persons
Upward Mobility 56.4 67.1 42.4 48.7
Downward Mobility 31.8 20.8 48.2 27.3
Number of observations 327 97 249 87
NOTE.– Weighted numbers. All values in %.
Table 6: Upward Mobility
Full Sample Married Persons
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
Female 0.033 -0.036 0.140** 0.140**
(0.036) (0.044) (0.059) (0.060)
Married -0.017
(0.055)
Married × female 0.175**
(0.073)
Second-gen. migrant 0.065 0.072 0.063 0.127
(0.059) (0.086) (0.082) (0.131)
× female 0.094 0.089 0.044 -0.062
(0.088) (0.130) (0.125) (0.190)
× married -0.009
(0.118)
× married × female -0.045
(0.183)
× endogamously married -0.126
(0.173)
× female × endogamously married 0.218
(0.238)
R2 0.010 0.021 0.027 0.029
F 2.849 2.671 3.009 2.352
N 1,794 1,794 760 760
NOTE.– Weights are used. Standard errors are adjusted for repeated observations on
family level.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
26Table 7: Downward Mobility
Full Sample Married Persons
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
Female 0.003 0.102** -0.165*** -0.165***
(0.037) (0.046) (0.056) (0.057)
Married 0.081
(0.056)
Married × female -0.266***
(0.073)
Second-gen. migrant -0.110* -0.045 -0.209** -0.104
(0.063) (0.086) (0.089) (0.131)
× female -0.048 -0.099 0.100 0.078
(0.087) (0.120) (0.125) (0.189)
× married -0.165
(0.122)
× married × female 0.200
(0.175)
× endogamously married -0.206
(0.128)
× female × endogamously married 0.018
(0.188)
R2 0.009 0.029 0.040 0.048
F 2.842 3.848 4.488 6.522
N 1,794 1,794 760 760
NOTE.– See Notes Table 6.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
27